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117, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1999). 
2. Can defendant prevail on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel where he has failed to assert any prejudice 
caused by his trial counsel's allegedly deficient performance? 
Where defendant raises his ineffective assistance claim for 
the first time on appeal, this Court reviews the matter on the 
record of the underlying trial as a matter of law. State v. 
Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). 
3. Was the evidence of defendant's attempted escape 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilt? 
A criminal conviction based on a jury verdict will be 
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is "so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that ^reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant 
committed the crime." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 
1994)(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 901(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides the 
following, as an example of authentication or identification 
conforming with the requirement of the rule: 
(5) Voice identification. Identification of 
a voice, whether heard firsthand or through 
mechanical or electronic transmission or 
recording, by opinion based upon hearing the 
voice at any time under circumstances 
connecting it with the alleged speaker. 
Utah R. Evid. 901(b) (5) (1999). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, governing attempt, provides in 
pertinent part: 
(1). . .a person is guilty of an attempt to 
commit a crime if, acting with the kind of 
culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, he engages in 
conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of the offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (1999). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309, governing escape, provides in 
pertinent part: 
(1) A prisoner is guilty of escape if he 
leaves official custody without 
authorization. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1) (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count each of coipaunications 
fraud, a second degree felony, and attempted escape, a class A 
misdemeanor (R. 1-4). Following a jury trial, he was convicted 
as charged (R. 121) . On the felony count, the trial court 
sentenced him to one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, 
to run consecutively to the sentence he was already serving 
(Id.). On the misdemeanor count, the court sentenced him to one 
year in the county jail, to run concurrently and to be served at 
the prison (Id.). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 
147) . 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant, who spoke with a distinctive East Coast accent 
and was sometimes known as "Boston Paul" or "Paul Dansforth", was 
incarcerated in the Davis County jail in July of 1998, when the 
incident giving rise to the instant charges arose (R. 2; R. 171: 
116-17; R. 172: 358, 394, 399, 456; R. 173: 542). While in jail, 
defendant befriended 73-year-old inmate Calvin Slaugh, who was 
awaiting sentencing on charges of rape and attempted rape of his 
mentally retarded daughter (R. 172: 249, 251, 257, 267, 296). 
Calvin said of defendant: "[H]e's a little bit smarter than I am. 
He's got a gift that I don't have. . . . He can draw you in and 
out and then ask you questions and lead you right into the water 
as far as I'm concerned" (Id. at 256). 
Calvin discussed his case with defendant, and defendant 
suggested he could withdraw his guilty plea and then pursue a 
defense to the charges (Id. at 256, 259). In the course of 
conversation, Calvin mentioned his brother, Ralph Slaugh (Id. at 
260). Defendant volunteered that he knew Ralph because he had 
mowed his lawn (Id. at 255). Later, defendant mentioned that one 
of-his close relatives was a bail bondsman and, consequently, 
that he would soon be released on bail. If Calvin would give his 
brother's telephone number to defendant, defendant would call him 
and arrange bail for Calvin as well (Id. at 262, 268). "Calvin 
testified that defendant was the only inmate with whom he ever 
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discussed bail and the only inmate to whom he gave Ralph's 
telephone number (Id. at 264-65). 
Ralph Slaugh testified that he spoke on the telephone three 
or four times with someone who identified himself as "Paul/' a 
Davis County jail official who was arranging bail for Calvin (Id. 
at 307-08). According to Ralph's testimony, "Paul" instructed 
him about bail procedures and told him that "due to the nature of 
the offense that my brother was being charged with it was 
necessary for them to use an alias for him to protect him from 
the other prisoners" (Id. at 309). "Paul" then gave Ralph the 
telephone number of a bail bondsman and instructed Ralph to bail 
Calvin out using the name of defendant, Joey Silva (Id. at 310). 
Ralph did as "Paul" instructed. He telephoned the bail 
bondsman and said that he would bail out "Joey Silva" (R. 171: 
160; R. 172: 313). He then met with the bail bondsman at the 
Davis County jail, prepared to pledge his home as collateral on a 
$25,000 bail bond for the release of his brother, whom he 
continued to refer to, as instructed by "Paul," as "Joey Silva" 
(R. 171: 160, 163; R. 172; 313). 
At about this same period of time, Officer Yeamon, in charge 
of Davis County jail operations and security, was investigating a 
matter unrelated to this case (R. 171: 115). Monitoring 
recordings of telephone calls made from the jail, he happened to 
hear defendant's distinctive voice on a tape. His interest was 
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piqued, and he listened long enough to realize there was a 
problem. Soon thereafter, he called in a detective (Id.). 
Yeamon eventually recorded eight conversations involving 
defendant (R. 172: 476). 
At trial, Todd Harris, the bail bondsman, testified that 
defendant called him to say that an individual named Slaugh had 
agreed to cosign to get him out of jail (R. 171: 159). 
Subsequently, the cosigner also contacted him by phone (Id. at 
160). Harris further testified that he picked up defendant's 
booking sheet at the jail and then met with Ralph Slaugh and his 
wife in the jail lobby (Id. at 160, 162). Harris was concerned 
that the Slaughs did not fully understand the extent of the 
commitment involved in using their home as collateral on a bail 
bond for someone who did not appear to be related to them. He 
testified: 
I've been in the business 11 years and it's 
extremely unusual for somebody to put up 
their house and put up $25,000 for an 
individual who he is not related to and does 
not have a very, very close relationship 
with. So something was just nagging me in 
the back of my mind that I couldn't put at 
ease. 
(Id. at 165-66). Pursuing his concern, Harris engaged the 
Slaughs in further conversation and learned that the Slaughs 
intended to bail out Ralph's brother, Calvin, who was in his 
seventies (Id. at 165, 169). Examining defendant's booking 
sheet, Harris realized that Calvin was considerably older than 
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defendant (Id. at 169). With further prompting by Harris, Ralph 
Slaugh eventually revealed "the whole story" of how he had been 
instructed to use defendant's name to bail out his brother (R. 
172: 315). At that juncture, the bail process came to an abrupt 
halt, and Harris notified the jail authorities "that someone was 
trying to pull a scam on Mr. Slaugh" (R. 171: 170; accord R. 172: 
313, 315). 
At trial, after the court had made foundational rulings as 
to admissibility, six witnesses for the State testified about 
their familiarity with defendant's voice and to the circumstances 
giving rise to that familiarity (R. 171: 113-14, 187-88 R. 172: 
476; R. 173: 524-27, 549, 581, 606). Each witness then testified 
that they recognized defendant's voice on the incriminating tape-
recorded conversations made from the jail (R. 117: 113-14, R. 
172: 476 R. 173: 531, 552, 554, 586, 607). Two other witnesses 
testified that no one else in jail at that time had a voice like 
defendant's (R. 173: 665, 678). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant first argues that the threshold admissibility of 
voice recognition testimony should be evaluated under the same 
state constitutional standard as is mandated for eyewitness 
identification testimony. He also contends that while the trial 
court engaged in the analysis he advocates, it erred in finding 
the testimony reliable enough to be admitted. 
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The State asserts that the voice recognition testimony in 
this case should be evaluated for foundational admissibility 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 901(b)(5). Because the 
witnesses knew defendant and could describe the circumstances 
under which they had become familiar with his voice, as well as 
his personal and distinct vocal peculiarities, their voice 
recognition testimony did not raise reliability concerns of 
constitutional magnitude. Any attacks on the accuracy of the 
recognitions based on the conditions under which the witnesses 
identified defendant's voice would, therefore, go to the weight 
of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. Furthermore, 
Utah's state constitutional eyewitness identification analysis is 
firmly rooted in scientific research. Defendant has made no 
showing that the scientific basis for questioning eyewitness 
identification has anything at all to do with voice recognition, 
much less that the two are so closely allied as to warrant 
identical constitutional scrutiny. 
Second, defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he asserts that 
his counsel performed deficiently by failing to request a 
cautionary jury instruction that mirrored the eyewitness 
identification instruction suggested in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483, 494-95 n.8 (Utah 1986). Where a lack of sufficient 
prejudice is the most expeditious way to dispose of an 
8 
ineffectiveness claim and where defendant has wholly failed to 
assert any prejudicial effect resulting from his counsel's 
allegedly deficient performance, his claim necessarily fails. 
Finally, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient 
to support his conviction for attempted escape. Defendant, 
however, has failed to consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict along with the reasonable 
inferences drawn from that evidence. Together, they plainly 
point to a plan of action undertaken by defendant to dupe Ralph 
Slaugh into bailing defendant out of jail in lieu of Ralph's 
incarcerated brother. Only the vigilance of the bailbondsman 
prevented defendant from achieving his desired end of unlawful 
release from jail. Under these factual circumstances, the jury 
could reasonably conclude that defendant intended to escape from 
custody and that he had taken a substantial step towards that 
end. No more was necessary to convict him of attempted escape. 
9 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN 
IT APPLIED THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
STANDARD FOR RELIABILITY OF 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
TESTIMONY, IT NONETHELESS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED THE VOICE RECOGNITION 
TESTIMONY WHERE THE WITNESSES 
PERSONALLY KNEW DEFENDANT, WERE 
FAMILIAR WITH HIS DISTINCTIVE 
VOICE, AND COULD, THEREFORE, 
RELIABLY IDENTIFY IT ON TAPE 
Defendant asserts first that the admissibility of 
"earwitness identification" testimony should be evaluated using 
the state constitutional standards that govern the threshold 
admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony (Br. of App. 
at 18). See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778-82 (Utah 1991); 
State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 488-93 (Utah 1986). Defendant bases 
this assertion on the premise that "essentially the same concerns 
exist with respect to earwitness identification as do in 
situations involving eyewitness identifications" (Br. of App. at 
18). Second, defendant contends that while the trial court 
engaged in the analysis he endorses, the court erred in 
determining that the voice recognition testimony in this case was 
sufficiently reliable to be admitted (Br. of App. at 20). The 
gist of defendant's argument, then, is that the trial court 
applied the correct law, but reached the wrong result. 
The State asserts, to the contrary, that the trial court 
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reached a correct result but did so by applying a legal analysis 
neither required by Utah law nor, indeed, ever considered by a 
Utah appellate court. 
a. A Ramirez-type analysis has never been required as a 
constitutional threshold for admitting voice recognition 
testimony; such testimony is properly analyzed under rule 
901(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The trial court in this case applied a Ramirez-type analysis 
to evaluate the threshold admissibility of the voice recognition 
testimony. And, while both parties at the time agreed that such 
an analysis applied, Utah law has never mandated such an approach 
(R. 171: 201-02; R. 172: 343; R. 173: 650-55). Indeed, no Utah 
appellate court has ever considered the matter, much less ruled 
upon it. 
Under current law, the voice recognition testimony here is 
properly governed by rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Pursuant to that rule, which governs authentication or 
identification, a voice may be identified >xby opinion based upon 
hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it 
with the alleged speaker." Utah R. Evid. 901(b)(5)(1999). Thus, 
any person may identify a speaker's voice as long as that person 
has heard the voice at any time. See, e.g., United States v. 
Cerone, 830 F.2d 938, 949 (8th Cir. 1987). Typically, "[a]n 
assertion by the witness of familiarity coupled with a 
description of the circumstances from which knowledge might 
reasonably be acquired will . . . suffice" to render the 
11 
testimony admissible. 2 Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal 
Evidence 5 901.5, at 710-11 (4th ed. 1996). Any attacks on the 
accuracy of the identification will therefore go to the weight of 
the evidence, rather than to its admissibility, and will 
accordingly be resolved by the jury. Id. at 711; accord United 
States v. Alvarez, 860 F.2d 801, 809 (7th Cir. 1988); United 
States v. Axselle, 604 F.2d 1330, 1338 (10th Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903, 915 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. 
Burnison, 795 P.2d 32, 40 (Kan. 1990), State v. Emil, 784 P.2d 
956, 958-59 (Nev. 1989). 
In this case, each of the witnesses who offered voice 
recognition testimony first explained the circumstances giving 
rise to their familiarity with defendant's voice (R. 171: 113-16, 
187; R. 172: 352-53, 388-91, 411, 415-18, 448-50, 476; R. 173: 
495-96). Then, in turn, the trial court ruled that the 
foundational testimony of each witness sufficed to render the 
testimony admissible1 (R. 172: 366, 485, 444, 465; R. 173: 512-
14, 517). Pursuant to rule 901(b)(5), the trial court thus 
fulfilled its obligation of ensuring that a reasonable jury could 
believe that each witness had sufficient familiarity with 
defendant's voice to identify it accurately. Nothing more is 
1
 The trial court reached its foundational ruling of 
admissibility by applying a Ramirez-type analysis, thus exceeding 
the requirements of rule 901. That is, it engaged in a more 
stringent inquiry than was actually necessary to establish a 
foundation for admissibility. 
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required for voice recognition testimony to be admitted under 
rule 901. 
b. This Court should not mandate a Ramirez-type analysis 
for the admissibility of voice recognition testimony, where 
such testimony is offered by witnesses who knew defendant 
personally, were familiar with his distinctive voice and, 
consequently, could reliably identify it on tape. 
Defendant urges this Court to extend the state 
constitutional due process analysis for determining the threshold 
admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony to voice 
recognition testimony as well (Br. of App. at 18). He 
rationalizes this expansion in the law by asserting that voice 
recognition testimony is subject to the same infirmities as 
eyewitness identification testimony and that its admissibility 
should, therefore, be governed by the same standard (Id.). 
At the outset, the Ramirez state constitutional analysis 
represents a distinct departure from federal law. Ramirez is 
rooted in Long, a case firmly grounded in virtually undisputed 
scientific research documenting the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification testimony. See Long, 721 P.2d at 488-90 (citing 
multiple scientific studies documenting the unreliability of 
eyewitness identifications). Both Ramirez and Long break new 
state constitutional ground precisely because the Utah Supreme 
Court found flawed scientific support for the federal model 
governing eyewitness identification. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 
U.S. 188 (1972)(articulating federal due process standard for 
13 
suggestive eyewitness identifications). In so departing from 
federal precedent, the Ramirez court observed: 
We noted [in Long! that NN several of the 
criteria listed by the Court [in Biggersl are 
based on assumptions that are flatly 
contradicted by well-respected and 
essentially unchallenged empirical studies 
[citation omitted]." We then stated that "in 
the area of eyewitness identification, the 
time has come for a more empirically sound 
approach [citation omitted]". . . . Long 
committed us to the proposition that a jury 
should consider different criteria than those 
set out in Biggers when determining the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications. 
We are bound to apply those same criteria 
when the admission of that same evidence is 
contested on reliability grounds under the 
due process clause of article I, section 7. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 780. The Ramirez ruling thus clearly 
articulates an analysis that is based on a specific body of 
scientific research expressly applicable to eyewitness 
identifications.2 
Defendant here asserts that voice recognition testimony is 
sufficiently analogous to eyewitness identification testimony to 
mandate the same constitutional test for reliability. In urging 
In contrast, the federal model articulated in Biggers is 
not based on any scientific evidence. And while some federal 
courts have chosen to expand the Biggers analysis to include 
voice recognition testimony, those that have done so uniformly 
fail to acknowledge or evaluate any differences, scientific or 
otherwise, between the two. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 
860 F.2d 801, 809-11 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Pheaster, 
544 F.2d 353, 368 (9th Cir. 1976). Moreover, the rule that these 
courts have extended is one that this jurisdiction has 
specifically rejected as unsound. 
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this expansion, however, defendant fails to cite any cases or 
studies documenting that the scientific basis for questioning the 
reliability of eyewitness identification has anything at all to 
do with voice recognition, much less that the two are so closely 
allied as to require identical scrutiny.3 
Ignoring the scientific underpinnings of Ramirez and Long, 
defendant simply argues that the voice identification testimony 
in this case was impermissibly suggestive (Br. of App. at 18-19). 
Indeed, he makes no argument that the other four Ramirez 
reliability factors, which together with suggestibility comprise 
the comprehensive test for the state constitutional admissibility 
of eyewitness identification testimony, should also apply here. 
The fundamental due process concern addressed by Ramirez is 
"'whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the 
identification was reliable/' Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781; accord 
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967); Manson v. 
Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). In Ramirez, three victims 
of an armed robbery, seated in a police car, were asked to 
identify a dark-skinned man handcuffed to a fence, lighted only 
by headlights and spotlights shining from nearby police cars. 
3
 Indeed, the two are facially dissimilar. The typical 
eyewitness identification requiring a Ramirez analysis would 
involve a crime victim identifying a stranger. Here, not only 
were the witnesses uninvolved in the crime but each of them was 
already personally familiar with defendant's distinctive voice. 
Thus, the voice recognitions at issue here would be analagous to 
a witness visually recognizing someone he or she already knew. 
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Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 777. In Long, the identification involved 
the victim of a shooting, who had seen the back or side of his 
assailant's face for about six seconds during a night-time 
assault. Long, 721 P.2d at 487. In both Long and Ramirez, the 
eyewitness identifications gave rise to the substantial 
likelihood of "irreparable misidentification," the central 
concern of the due process reliability analysis. Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). 
Under the circumstances of this case, however, there simply 
was no substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. 
The witnesses here all personally knew defendant. Each witness 
was familiar with defendant's distinctive voice from multiple, 
previous interactions with him (R. 171: 113-14, 187; R. 172: 388-
91, 411-12, 448-50; R. 173: 495-96, 502, 524, 549, 581, 606). 
For these witnesses to recognize defendant's voice was far more 
analogous to an individual recognizing his next door neighbor's 
voice or the voice of a friend on the telephone than to a crime 
victim or witness identifying a stranger at a crime scene or from 
a photo array, as in the cases relied upon by defendant. See 
State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1107, 1111-13 (Utah 1994); 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 777; State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487-88 
(Utah 1986) . 
And, not only were the witnesses familiar with defendant's 
voice, but, according to the testimony of ten of them, 
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defendant's voice was particularly distinctive and easily 
recognizable due to its strong Boston accent, its nasal tonality, 
and the distinctive phraseology defendant routinely employed (R. 
171: 116-17; R. 172: 358, 394, 414, 421, 450, 453, 456, 478, 480, 
489; R. 173: 496, 498, 525-27, 587, 608, 612). 
Two additional witnesses, who worked at the jail, who knew 
defendant, and who were familiar with his voice, testified that 
no one else in the limited population of the Davis County Jail at 
the time the telephone calls were made and recorded, had a voice 
that could reasonably be mistaken for defendant's (R. 173: 665, 
678). That the calls were placed by a jail inmate was 
undisputed. 
Under these circumstances, where each witness had personal 
experience with defendant, there is little likelihood that each 
witness's immediate recognition of defendant's taped voice was 
anything but a product of the witness's own memory of defendant. 
Consequently, the constitutional reliability of the testimony is 
not implicated and a Ramirez-type analysis is not warranted. 
c. To the extent the trial court applied a Ramirez-type 
analysis to evaluate the suggestibility of the voice 
recognitions, it reached a correct result 
Even if this Court were to adopt a Ramirez-type analysis for 
reviewing the trial court's admission of the voice recognition 
testimony, the determination to admit the evidence would be 
affirmed, as would defendant's conviction. 
17 
In raising the suggestibility of the voice recognitions, 
defendant has lumped together all of the voice recognition 
witnesses, failing to note the significant differences in their 
testimony. In evaluating the circumstances under which the voice 
recognitions occurred, however, three distinct categories of 
identifications emerge, each of which passes constitutional 
muster under the test defendant advocates. 
First, Officer Bob Yeamon, who had known defendant for 
several years and who described his "unmistakable" voice in 
detail, testified that he recognized defendant's voice on tape 
sua sponte while he was investigating an unrelated matter (R. 
171: 113-18).4 Notably, defendant has not asserted - nor can it 
be persuasively argued - that this spontaneous voice recognition 
was in any way the product of suggestion. This identification 
alone would provide the necessary nexus between defendant and the 
incriminating telephone calls. Cf. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 
342, 345 (Utah 1985)(citing State v. Kilpatrick, 173 P.2d 284, 
285 (1946) and State v. Karas, 136 P. 788, 790 (Utah 1913)(if 
voice identification is only evidence connecting defendant to 
crime, victim/witness must show both prior familiarity with voice 
and some peculiarity of voice that makes it readily 
4
 Yeamon stated that he was listening to recorded telephone 
conversations initiated in the jail when he suddenly recognized 
defendant's voice and became interested in the content of the 
conversation (R. 172: 476). 
18 
identifiable)). 
Second, Officers Fielding and Brian each listened to the 
tape-recorded telephone conversations alone (R. 172: 453, 462, 
463; R. 173: 506, 554, 585).5 The inference of suggestibility in 
their voice recognitions comes from the physical condition of the 
tapes, which were marked "conversations with Joey Silva," or from 
the words of the detective who asked if the witness could 
identify Joey Silva's voice on the tapes (R. 172: 454; R. 173: 
506). Both witnesses, however, had known defendant for some 
time, were quite familiar with his voice, and described its 
unique and obvious peculiarities (R. 172: 448-50, 453, 455, 456-
57, 4 95-98. Where the trial court made detailed findings and 
conclusions articulating that the subsequent identifications made 
by these witnesses were the product of memory and not suggestion, 
this Court should sustain that determination (R. 172: 464-65; R. 
173: 512-13). 
Finally, Officers Morrison and Carter listened to the tapes 
at a group meeting (R. 172: 424; R. 173: 515, 612). Even this 
circumstance, arguably the most suggestive at issue, does not 
rise to the level of constitutionally impermissible 
suggestibility where each individual knew defendant, was familiar 
with his voice, and could describe its unique characteristics (R. 
5
 Contrary to defendant's assertion, Officer Brian 
testified that he listened to the tapes alone. Compare Br. of 
App. at 22 with R. 173: 585-86. 
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171: 390-91, 394; R. 172: 411-12, 414-16, 421). 
In this case, then, even if this Court were to adopt a 
Ramirez-type test to evaluate the suggestibility of the voice 
identifications, it would necessarily determine as a matter of 
law that the trial court engaged in the proper inquiry, made the 
appropriate findings, and reached the legally correct conclusion. 
For these reasons, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion 
to suppress the voice identification testimony should be 
affirmed. 
POINT TWO 
WHERE DEFENDANT CONTENDS THAT HE 
RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL AT TRIAL BUT FAILS TO 
ASSERT ANY PREJUDICIAL EFFECT BASED 
ON THE ALLEGEDLY DEFICIENT 
PERFORMANCE, HIS CLAIM MUST FAIL 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel performed 
deficiently by failing to request an eyewitness identification 
instruction cautioning the jury about the pitfalls of voice 
recognition testimony (Br. of App. at 27-28). See Long, 721 P.2d 
at 494-95 n.8 (suggested cautionary instruction for eyewitness 
identification testimony). Notably, however, while he argues 
that such an instruction would have given the jury the 
opportunity to "consider the numerous factors that should be 
considered in evaluating voice identification testimony/' he does 
not assert that such an instruction would have created a 
reasonable probability of a different trial outcome for him. See 
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Br. of App. at 28. 
In order to establish constitutionally ineffective 
assistance of counsel, defendant must show that his counsel's 
performance was so deficient that it fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and that, but for the deficient 
performance, a reasonable probability existed that the outcome of 
the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 
(Utah 1990). The Utah Supreme Court has further stated that a 
reviewing court need not determine the deficient performance 
prong if there has been no showing of prejudice. x> *If it is 
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of 
lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be.so, 
that course should be followed.'" State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 
405 (Utah 1986)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 
In this case, defendant has wholly failed to assert any 
claim of prejudice arising from his attorney's alleged 
deficiency.6 Instead, he merely asserts that had his counsel 
acted differently, the jury could have considered additional 
factors in assessing the voice recognition testimony (Br. of App. 
Even if this Court were to consider defendant's claim of 
deficient performance, that claim would fail from the outset. 
Where the rule of law on which defendant bases his assertion of 
ineffectiveness has never been adopted in Utah, his counsel 
plainly cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to assert it. 
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at 28). Such an assertion falls well short of demonstrating that 
a different jury instruction would likely have changed the 
outcome of his trial. For this reason alone, defendant's 
ineffectiveness claim must fail. 
POINT THREE 
THE RECORD EVIDENCE AMPLY SUPPORTS 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR 
ATTEMPTED ESCAPE 
In conducting a review for sufficiency of the evidence, this 
Court should not disturb the jury's verdict "so long as some 
evidence and reasonable inferences" support the jury's decision. 
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990). 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his conviction for attempted escape (Br. of App. at 29-
30). The Utah statute governing escape provides that *[a] 
prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody 
without authorization." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1) (1999). The 
attempt statute provides that "a person is guilty of an attempt 
to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability 
otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he engages 
in* conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission 
of the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1)(1999). 
In this case, the record contains ample evidence 
demonstrating both that defendant intended to escape from jail • 
and that he took a substantial step towards doing so. First, 
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defendant's intent may be inferred from the record evidence. See 
State v, Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992) ("While evidence 
of intent is usually not susceptible of direct proof, it can 
often be inferred from circumstance") (citations omitted). And 
second, the record directly demonstrates that defendant took a 
substantial step towards making his unlawful departure from jail 
a reality. 
Calvin Slaugh testified that defendant offered to arrange 
for Calvin's bail if Calvin would give defendant his brother's 
telephone number (R. 172: 262, 268). Calvin also testified that 
defendant was the only person in jail to whom he gave the 
telephone number or discussed bail (Id. at 264, 265). Ralph 
Slaugh, Calvin's brother, testified that someone who called 
himself "Paul" and who said that he worked at the jail, called 
and told him he could bail Calvin out, but that he should do so 
by using defendant's name rather than Calvin's (Id. at 307-09). 
Defendant was also known as "Paul" (R. 172: 456; R. 173: 542). 
The telephone calls from "Paul" originated from the jail and 
were tape-recorded (R. 171: 60-64). Officer Yeamon testified 
that he was listening to tapes of inmate telephone calls, 
investigating something unrelated to this case, when he 
recognized defendant's distinctive voice as part of a 
conversation that piqued his interest (R. 171: 115; R. 172: 476). 
He pursued the matter, eventually recording eight incriminating 
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conversations involving defendant, who on several tapes 
identified himself as "Paul" (R. 172: 476). He also correlated 
the tapes to a log documenting jail telephone use (R. 173: 723). 
Another officer testified that he logged in entries documenting 
defendant's use of the telephone (R. 173: 693-94). 
Officers Fielding and Brian, who knew defendant from 
previous dealings with him and who were also familiar with his 
distinctive voice, each listened to the tapes individually and 
testified unequivocally that the voice on the tape was 
defendant's (R. 172: 448, 450, 453, 455, 456; R. 173: 496, 498, 
506, 585). In addition, two other officers who also previously 
knew defendant and were familiar with his voice listened to the 
tapes in a group conference and immediately recognized 
defendant's voice (R. 173: 524-27, 531, 533, 606-08, 611). 
Under these factual circumstances, the jury could reasonably 
have determined that the person holding himself out as "Paul" on 
the tapes was, in fact, defendant. And the jury could also 
reasonably infer not only that defendant intended to escape from 
custody but also that defendant had taken a substantial step 
toward that goal by duping Ralph Slaugh into bailing him out of 
jail, thinking all the while it was his brother, Calvin, whose 
release he was securing. Given the facts and the reasonable 
inferences drawn from those facts, the evidence sufficed to 
sustain the jury's verdict of guilt to the charge of attempted 
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escape. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions for communications fraud and attempted escape. 
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